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ABSTRACT 
 
For over 70 years, the Florida citrus industry has been protected from foreign competition by a 
tariff on orange juice. The orange juice tariff is currently being threatened by negotiations over 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Brazil is the leading foreign competitor to the Florida citrus industry. The tariff prevents 
Brazil from becoming a large citrus cartel that could take control of the world’s orange juice 
market. The Florida citrus industry contributes $9.1 billion to Florida’s economy and provides 
jobs for 90,000 Florida citizens. Orange juice production is a key to the strength of Florida’s 
economy. Florida citrus growers argue that the tariff is the most important issue facing the 
industry’s survival. Without the tariff, Florida citrus growers are in danger of going out of 
business. This could devastate Florida’s economy. It is important that Florida citrus growers and 
FTAA negotiators unite and intensify efforts to protect the citrus tariff and ensure the survival of 
Florida’s citrus industry. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he world’s citrus market is dominated by two main players: Florida and Sao Paulo, Brazil.  Eighty-five 
percent of the world’s orange juice supply is produced by these two competitors. Brazil exports 99% 
of its juice. Florida exports only 6% of its juice (“Florida Citrus,” 2003). In order to gain market share 
and thus stifle competition, Brazil is willing to sell its orange juice to the United States at prices that are below United 
States and Florida production costs (“Florida Farm Bureau,” 2003).  
 
 As a result of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act, there is a tariff placed on imported orange juice. However, this 
tariff is currently being threatened by negotiations over the FTAA agreement. In an effort to unite the economies of 
the Americas, the WTO is calling for the gradual elimination of all tariffs within the 34 countries that participate in the 
free trade area. The FTAA discussions to eliminate the tariff are eminent as early as year-end of 2005 (LaVigne, 
2003a). 
 
 Florida’s citrus industry pumps $9.1 billion into Florida’s economy. In addition, it provides jobs to nearly 
90,000 Florida citizens (LaVigne, 2003b). Orange juice production, which is integral to the Florida citrus industry, is a 
key to the strength of Florida’s economy. If the orange juice tariff is reduced or eliminated, Brazil could become a 
large cartel and take control of the orange juice market. By offering prices below production costs, Brazilian orange 
juice could flood the United States’ markets (“Florida Farm Bureau,” 2003). Without the tariff, there is potential for 
the devastation of Florida’s citrus industry (Zekri, 2003). Although large growers may be able to compete with 
Brazilian orange juice processors, small growers may be forced out of the livelihood that has supported generations of 
Florida citizens. Maintaining the current citrus tariff is the number one priority for the Florida citrus industry (“Florida 
Farm Bureau,” 2003).   
 
THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY:  AN OVERVIEW 
 
Florida produces more citrus than any other state in the United States. The citrus industry follows tourism as 
the state’s second largest industry. It provides jobs for 90,000 Florida citizens, and pumps annual revenue of $9.1 
T 
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billion into Florida’s economy. The mean employment growth rate for the citrus industry increases 12% per year. 
Florida citrus workers earn an average of 77% over the Florida minimum hourly wage of $5.15 per hour (“U.S. 
Department of Labor,” 2005).  
 
As of September 2004, 748,555 acres of Florida’s 10 million acres of farmland were planted in citrus 
(“Florida Agricultural Statistics,” 2004). Almost all (90%) of Florida’s citrus is processed into canned, chilled or 
frozen concentrate (Hodges, Philippakos, Mulkey, Spreen, & Muraro, 2001). The remaining 10% is shipped as fresh 
fruit. In 2003, citrus commodities accounted for 19% of all agricultural sales in the state of Florida (“Florida 
Agricultural Statistics,” 2004).  
 
During the 2003-2004 season, the majority of the harvest (57%) was grown in central, western and southern 
Florida counties. Polk County produced 42.2 million boxes. Highlands County produced 35.3 million boxes. Hendry 
County produced 33.9 million boxes. Desoto County produced 28.9 million boxes. St. Lucie County produced 25.8 
million boxes. This totaled 166.1 million boxes. Total citrus harvested in the state of Florida was 292 million boxes, 
which represents 77% of the total United States’ citrus production (“Florida Agricultural Statistics,” 2004).  
 
Although most of the Florida citrus industry’s market is domestic, Florida also exports citrus to Canada and 
Japan. During the 2003-2004 season, citrus exports totaled more than 23.4 million cartons. Canada accounted for most 
of the Florida exports of oranges and specialty fruits such as Tangelos and temples. Japan was the top export country 
for Florida grapefruit (Hoag, 2004). Exporting Florida citrus increases sales and income, diversifies market risk by 
offsetting lags in domestic demand and reduces unit cost.  
 
Florida growers’ costs increase year after year. Tangible costs include labor, environmental factors, 
production, insurance, and worker protection standards. In addition, Florida citrus growers are responsible for 
intangible or phantom costs (Muraro, n.d.). Each year citrus growers spend countless hours attending meetings during 
which changing regulations are discussed. In addition, growers are required to expend time completing bureaucratic 
paperwork that details the ongoing changes. The Peace River Valley Citrus Growers Association in conjunction with 
the University of Florida, the Florida Department of Citrus and Florida Citrus Mutual are currently documenting the 
exact costs of phantom compliance. 
 
THE COMPETITION:  BRAZIL’S CITRUS INDUSTRY 
 
 Brazil is a formidable competitor. In terms of its economy and population, Brazil is the largest country in 
South America. The country has a population in excess of 184 million. Its gross domestic product is $1.375 trillion. 
Regardless of numerous economic shocks, between 2001 and 2003 Brazil’s economy grew 1.1% per year. Brazil’s 
economy is stronger than economies of all other South American countries. In addition, Brazil is expanding its 
presence in world markets. With 23% of Brazil’s exports going to the United States and 20% of Brazil’s imports 
coming from the United States, Brazil is a significant trading partner of the United States (“CIA World Fact Book,” 
2004). 
 
 The motivation for development of the Brazilian citrus industry was due in part to the 1962 freeze of citrus 
groves in the United States. The freeze resulted in great economic loss and slow recovery for the United States.  By 
1963, Brazil produced over 5000 tons of citrus. The economic impact was a $2 million dollar incentive for Brazilians 
to produce more citrus. With ongoing growth of orange juice exports, Brazil is now the world’s leading orange juice 
producer (Hoag, 2004).  
 
 Brazil exports 99% of its frozen concentrate orange juice (FCOJ). Brazil’s largest market for FCOJ is Europe 
followed by North America. In 2004, Europe purchased 1,371 million single strength equivalent (SSE) gallons and  
 
NAFTA countries purchased 234 million SSE gallons. Florida buys 15% of Brazil’s FCOJ. This concentrate is mixed 
with Florida juice—a process that improves the color of Florida juice. The concentrate also makes up for seasonal 
supply deficits.  Brazilian owned companies in Florida include Cargill Citro America located in Frostproof, Florida;  
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S.A. Louis Dreyfus et Cie located in Winter Gardens, Florida;  Cutrale Citrus Juices U.S.A., Inc. located in 
Auburndale and Leesburg, Florida; and Citrosuco Paulista S.A. located in Alcoma, Florida. 
Cost Advantages for Brazil 
 
 Florida produces approximately 457 boxes of citrus per acre. Brazil produces approximately 257 boxes of 
citrus per acre or a differential of 78% in favor of Florida. Nonetheless, Brazil reaps production cost advantages. 
University of Florida agricultural economists Thomas H. Spreen and Ron Muraro report Sao Paulo production costs to 
be $259.69 per acre. Production costs in southwest Florida are reported to be $721.68 per acre, which is a differential 
of 178% per acre cost in favor of Brazil (Muraro, Spreen, & Prozzan, 2001). 
 
 These cost advantages are due to Brazil’s lack of environmental regulations, low worker protection 
standards, unregulated food safety standards, un-enforced child labor practices, low exchange rates and low labor 
costs.  For example, Florida citrus workers earn $60 a day compared to Brazilian workers who earn $60 per week. In 
addition, the floating of the Brazilian Real, which was placed on the international market in 1999, led to a 31% 
decrease of the value of the Real ( Muraro, Spreen, & Prozzan, 2001).  This in turn led to a decrease in harvesting 
costs and placed Florida citrus growers at an even greater cost disadvantage. 
 
Costs in Brazil are further reduced because of child labor. In Brazil, an estimated three million children work 
on plantations that produce sugar cane, tea, tobacco, sisal and agricultural products (U.S. Department of Labor, 1995). 
During the peak harvest season, 150,000 children between the ages of 6 years and 18 years labor in Brazil’s citrus 
fields. Fifty-four percent of these children are between the ages of 7 years and 14 years. These children work 14 hours 
per day for which they are paid an average wage of $3.00. Although the government of Brazil supports the 
International Labor Organization’s Conventions No. 138 and No. 182 that advocate a minimum age for admission to 
employment and humane child labor practices, neither of these conventions is implemented into actual law.  
 
DUMPING OF ORANGE JUICE INTO THE UNITED STATES’ MARKET 
 
 Dumping is an informal economic term that designates selling a product in a foreign country for less than 
either the price of the product in the domestic country or the cost of making the product. In order to gain market share 
and to increase competition, Brazilian processors are willing to sell their orange juice to the United States at prices 
that are below the United States’ production costs (“Florida Citrus,” 2003). In 1997, an anti-dumping order was 
mandated by an international court. However, Brazil continues to dump orange juice into the United States’ market. 
 
 In a memorandum dated August 30, 2004, Ronald K. Lorentzen, Acting Director of the Office of United 
States Policy, wrote to James J. Jochum, Assistant Secretary of Import Administration, briefing him of Brazil’s 
dumping activities (“Public Document,” 2004).  Pursuant to section 751(c) of the Smoot-Harley Tariff Act of 1930, 
the United States has monitored Brazil’s dumping activity since 1987.The purpose of the scrutiny was to evaluate if 
revocation of the anti-dumping order would lead to continuation of Brazil’s dumping of orange juice into the United 
States’ market. 
 
 In order to determine if Brazilian companies were practicing ongoing dumping tactics, the weighted-average 
dumping margins from Brazilian citrus companies and the volume of imports of orange juice for the period before and 
after the issuance of the anti-dumping order were evaluated. After a 120 day review, it was reported to the 
International Trade Commission that the dumping margin for all Brazilian citrus companies was 1.69%. However, for 
Citrovita Argo Industrial, Ltda, a Brazilian citrus company that refused to comply with the anti-dumping order, the 
dumping margin was 15.98%. The report concluded that revocation of the anti-dumping order could lead to 
continuation and/or recurrence of dumping.  
 
HISTORY OF THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS AGREEMENT 
 
 The FTAA agreement was conceived at the Summit of the Americas that was held in 1994. The Summit 
brought together heads of state and government officials of 34 countries. In order to eliminate barriers to trade that 
were blocking third world countries from access to larger markets, it was proposed that a free trade area was needed. 
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Creating a free trade area of the Americas would allow the United States and its Western neighbors an opportunity to 
shape open markets for their benefit. 
 
Free trade proponents seek to increase competition and reduce costs of a product or service to the consumer. 
The FTAA would offer poor countries the opportunity to prosper from exports and foreign investments. In addition, 
the United States and its allied countries would reap the benefit of cheaper goods and new trade related jobs. Further, 
the FTAA agreement would contribute to improved standards of living for citizens of third world nations and improve 
the health, labor, environmental and working conditions of the Americas. 
 
Negotiations for the agreement are to be complete by the end of 2005. Timely enforcement will follow. With 
implementation, 56% of agricultural imports to the Western hemisphere will be duty free.  
 
A successful, well-crafted FTAA deal will: 
 
 provide a means to lessen the blow for workers and industries that might be adversely affected by unfair 
competition, 
 advocate modern, effective business practices and strengthen behaviors that encourage long-term economic 
health, property rights, investor rights, health and labor standards, and environmental protections, 
 back judicial systems that effectively enforce laws, 
 discourage bureaucratic red-tape that encourages corruption and prevents fair competition, 
 request civil society to monitor progress, and 
 eliminate the rights of foreign investors to inhibit national, state and provincial authorities from protecting 
human health and the environment. 
 
THE CITRUS TARIFF:  A HISTORY    
 
The FCOJ citrus tariff was conceived with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.  Senate Finance 
Chairman Reed Smoot, a Republican from Utah, and Ways and Means Chairman Willis C. Hawley, a Republican 
from Oregon, were the leaders of the act.  The Smoot-Hawley Act was a controversial piece of legislation (Trumbore, 
n.d.). The bill raised tariffs on farm products to the highest ever in American history.  For example, a tax of $.70 per 
SSE gallon was imposed on imported citrus juice. 
 
Despite wide protests, President Hoover signed the bill into law.  In retaliation, foreign nations shut-out 
United States’ goods, which resulted in a sharp decline in United States’ foreign trade. The tariff was not changed 
until 1947 when the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks occurred in Geneva, Switzerland.  At this 
time the tariff, was reduced to $.35 per SSE gallon.  A further reduction of the tariff was proposed in 1963 under 
President Kennedy and again in 1970 under President Nixon. However, the tariff was not reduced. 
 
It was not until the Uruguay Round of GATT proceedings that the tariff on FCOJ was again discussed. At 
this time, a FCOJ tariff schedule for the major orange juice importing countries was implemented. A gradual reduction 
of the orange juice tariff has been taking place ever since. Today the citrus tariff is at $.297 per SSE gallon on FCOJ 
and $.1704 per SSE gallon for orange juice in the United States. See exhibit 1. 
 
As a result of current FTAA negotiations, the reduction or elimination of the tariff is again a possibility. This 
tariff protects the livelihood of the Florida citrus industry. If the tariff is reduced or eliminated, the citrus industry 
could experience devastating consequences, which in turn, could serve an unrecoverable blow to the Florida economy 
and the citizens of the state of Florida.  
 
THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE CITRUS TARIFF   
 
Florida citrus growers produce their product without government subsidies or price supports. This is in 
contrast to other commodities that realize benefits that equal 5% to 50% of the value of their production  In addition, 
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Florida growers sponsor advanced research projects that lead to knowledge of productive harvesting techniques and 
methods, Florida growers are recognized as the world’s most efficient producers of citrus (LaVigne, 2003a). 
 
 
Exhibit 1:  FCOJ Tariff Schedule For Major Orange Juice 
Importing Countries Under GATT 
 
Year US Europe Japan 
 cents/SSE gal 
1994 35.01 19.00 30.00 
1995 34.13 18.37 29.25 
1996 33.24 17.74 28.50 
1997 32.36 17.10 27.75 
1998 31.48 16.47 27.00 
1999 30.59 15.84 26.25 
2000 and beyond 29.71 15.20 25.50 
Source: (Muraro, n.d.) 
 
 
Elimination of the citrus tariff could have a detrimental effect on the Florida citrus industry and the state of 
Florida. See exhibits 2 and 3. 
 
 
Exhibit 2:  Costs Of Producing Oranges And Bulk 
Orange Concentrate For The U.S. Market 
 
($ per lb. Solid) In Florida In Brazil 
Orange production costs 0.7849 0.4435 
Orange processing costs 0.2034 0.1691 
Shipping to port, storage, harbor charges  0.0292 
Ocean freight, insurance, product inspection  0.1001 
U.S. tariff  0.2890 
Florida equalization tax  0.0299 
Total costs 0.9883 1.0608 
Total costs without U.S. tariff 0.9883 0.7718 
Source: (Muraro, Spreen, & Prozzan, 2001) 
 
 
Exhibit 3:  Financial Impact Of Tariff On Florida Orange Grove Profitability 
 
 Current Market Impact Of Lost Tariff 
Five-yr. Avg. orange yields/acre 365 boxes  
Five-yr. Avg. juice yields/box 6.5 lb  
Five-yr. Avg. juice yields/acre 2373 lb. Solids  
Five-yr. Avg. cash price/lb solids $0.89 $0.69 
Cost of orange production $.7849 per lb solids  
Net return per acre $249.00 ($225.00) 
Source: (Florida Agricultural Statistics Service, 2004) 
 
 
In addition, it would not accomplish all of the goals of the FTAA, which are to increase competition, decrease 
cost to the consumer and contribute to overall global economic growth. If orange juice tariffs are reduced or 
eliminated, the price of United States’ imports of bulk FCOJ from Brazil along with the United States’ wholesale price 
of orange juice would fall by as much as 35%. Along with the price reduction, the volume of FCOJ imports from 
Brazil could increase because the Brazilian juice could be diverted from other markets into the United States 
(LaVigne, 2003b).  
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An orange tree does not begin to bear fruit until it is three to four years old.  Thus, the supply of oranges cannot 
be manipulated in the short-run to react to price increases. As a result, the United States’ on-tree price of juice oranges 
could plunge. This could, in turn, cause growers’ rates of return to drop below the break-even point, which could 
result in widespread grove closures. 
 
The ripple effect of these closures could represent harsh consequences for: 
 
 nurseries that supply replacement trees to citrus groves, 
 suppliers of fertilizer, fungicide, herbicide and insecticide, 
 suppliers of irrigation and spraying systems, mechanical harvesters and farm implements, 
 financial institutions that support the citrus industry, 
 insurance companies that serve the citrus industry, and 
 freight companies that haul citrus to processing plants (LaVigne, 2003b). 
 
It costs Florida growers $.99 to deliver a gallon of orange juice to a Florida processor. Brazilian companies 
pay $1.06, which includes the $.29 tariff per gallon. See exhibit 2. Without the tariff, the cost to Brazilian companies 
to deliver juice would drop to $.78 per gallon. This would give Brazil a significant competitive advantage. Cost 
advantages combined with a cartel-like market structure enables Brazilian producers to adjust prices in a predatory 
manner. 
 
In a global industry such as citrus, free trade alone cannot deliver the rewards of price benefits to consumers, 
increased competition and worldwide economic growth and prosperity. A reduction or elimination of the citrus tariff 
could encourage a global monopoly.  In order to accomplish these objectives, the citrus tariff must be maintained. As 
the United States moves forward with its efforts to negotiate multilateral trade agreements, it is crucial to the state of 
Florida and to its citrus growers that the current tariff on imported orange juice is maintained. 
 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ELIMINATION OF THE CITRUS TARIFF 
  
 Florida citrus growers are waging a battle to preserve the current citrus tariff. Florida Citrus Mutual, a 
voluntary cooperative whose active membership consists of 11, 676 Florida citrus growers, is aiding Florida growers 
in their campaign to fight for their industry. In 2003, Florida Citrus Mutual formed a Citrus Tariff Oversight 
Committee (CTOC) that has 14 members. The committee oversees all industry coordinated efforts to preserve the 
citrus tariff. These efforts include the political, legislative and public relations aspects of the fight.  
  
 In addition, the citrus industry has garnered support from key political leaders. The leaders are: Florida 
Governor Jeb Bush; Congressman Adam Putnam; Agricultural Commissioner Charles H. Bronson; Bill Paxton and 
Joel Jankowsky from the House of Representatives; and Senators Bill Nelson and Bob Graham. Support measures 
include: 
 
 a $.015 per box tax that will support the Citrus Preservation Fund, 
 active grower involvement with the CTOC, 
 a public relations campaign that is entitled Citrus Matters, 
 an informative Web site: http://www.citrusmatters.com, and 
 support from regional allies including Costa Rica, Mexico and Belize. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 This paper was not the result of empirical evidence. It did not address the reason for Brazil’s pursuit of the 
Florida market. Nor did it examine the direct impact of the tariff on Brazil’s citrus industry. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Future research should focus on the national citrus industry. In addition, future research should be directed 
toward industries such as textiles, steel and automobiles that have related tariffs. Although the direct impact can be 
measured, the economic multiplier effect needs to be evaluated in order to fully understand the total economic impact. 
On a broader scale, because global pressures can cause reductions in tariffs, the short-term and long-term employment 
impact should be studied. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE INDUSTRY 
 
 As the economy progresses down a global path, industries that are protected by tariffs should assess the 
economic impact of possible tariff reductions and/or eliminations. Globalization is contra-tariff by nature. Thus, it is 
possible that protective tariffs of the past will be threatened. In addition, because employment and government 
revenues are affected by tariff reductions and eliminations, federal, state and local governments should assess the 
impact of possible tariff reductions and/or eliminations. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The elimination or reduction of the current citrus tariff could impose a negative economic impact on the 
Florida citrus industry and the state of Florida. Brazilian orange juice could flood the market, which could create 
orange juice prices that are below Florida growers’ production costs. Smaller growers could have difficulty staying in 
business. Although larger companies are more capable of competing with Brazilian processors, there is no guarantee 
of their long-term survival. Keeping the current citrus tariff is the number one priority for the Florida citrus industry. 
Reduction or elimination of the tariff could allow Brazil to gain a monopoly on the citrus industry, set prices, and thus, 
make the United States dependent upon their orange juice.  
 
 Although it is impossible to predict exact cost effects of technological change or future citrus price behavior, 
the reality is that loss of the United States’ orange juice tariff could harm the Florida citrus industry and the economy 
of the state of Florida. It is important that Florida citrus growers and FTAA negotiators unite and intensify efforts to 
protect the citrus tariff and ensure the survival of Florida’s citrus industry. 
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